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I. Introduction 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution1  provides:  
“Nor (shall a person) be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”2  Early in the country’s history, courts defined public 
use very narrowly and allowed for the Public Use Clause to be satisfied 
with takings that satisfied government purposes such as roads, schools, and 
forts.3  In 1789, the Supreme Court started to marginally broaden that 
definition of public use.4  More recently, the Court in three cases, Berman 
v. Parker,5  Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,6 and Kelo v. City of New 
London,7  has dramatically expanded the types of takings that would satisfy 
the clause.8  This trilogy of cases leaves states with the clear understanding 
that the Supreme Court will give strong deference to their determination of 
what constitutes a public use.9 
One of the most unpopular Supreme Court decisions in history,10  Kelo 
reignited a long dormant national interest in property rights.11  In what 
                                                                                                     
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2. See id. (setting forth what is now known as the Public Use Clause). 
 3. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 512 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that early takings were for uses that were unchallenged as to public 
use). 
 4. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1789) (“[A] law that takes property from A 
and gives it to B:  It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature 
with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.” (emphasis 
deleted)). 
 5. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (ruling that private property could 
be taken for a public purpose with just compensation). 
 6. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (ruling that a Hawaii 
Land Reform Act of 1967 was constitutional as the condemnations of lessor’s property and 
the subsequent distribution of that property to lessees satisfies a public purpose). 
 7. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469 (ruling that the governmental taking of property from 
one private owner to another in furtherance of economic development constitutes a 
permissible public use under the Fifth Amendment). 
 8. See id. at 482 (stating that the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved over time with 
respect to public use). 
 9. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S.  at 240 (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 55, 66, 46 S.Ct. 39, 40, 70 L.Ed. 162 (1925)) (stating that great deference 
will be given to the legislature in determining public use) (citing Old Dominion Co. v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)). 
 10. See The Civil Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse:  Testimony Before 
the United States Commission on Civil Rights (2011) (statement of Ilya Somin, Professor of 
ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITIES 75 
 
some scholars referred to as “a uniting of strange bedfellows,” traditionally 
unaligned groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), the American Association of Retired People 
(AARP), the Property Rights Foundation of America, and the American 
Farm Bureau all came together to oppose a further broadening of the Public 
Use Clause.12  The brief of amici curiae submitted on behalf of the 
NAACP, the AARP, the Hispanic Alliance of Atlanta County, and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference noted that ethnic and racial 
minorities, the elderly, and the indigent have been disproportionally 
impacted by eminent domain, and the expansion of the Public Use Clause 
was particularly harmful to those least able to oppose such takings.13  In his 
dissent in Kelo, Justice Thomas cited these arguments as reasons why the 
Public Use Clause should not be broadened, explaining that the Kelo 
decision would only exacerbate the harm these groups have already faced.14 
Since Kelo was decided, forty-two states have passed legislation to 
provide varying levels of protection for property owners.15  Many of the 
reform laws were passed in either 2006 or 2007, when public animosity to 
the Kelo decision was still at its peak.16  Since that time, scholars have 
begun to criticize those laws as rushed attempts to appease public sentiment 
                                                                                                     
Law, George Mason University) (explaining that polls showed over 80 percent of the public 
opposed the Court’s decision) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL. RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 11. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT:  HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 3 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2008) (demonstrating the 
decade long complacency with property rights had ended). 
 12. See Nick Gillespie, Kelo Makes Strange Bedfellows, Part 234, REASON, Jul. 1, 
2005, http://reason.com/blog/2005/07/01/kelo-makes-strange-bedfellows (explaining the 
seemingly unlikely political alliances that were formed as a result of the publicity 
surrounding Kelo v. City of New London) (citing Carolyn Lochhead, Foes in Congress 
Unite in Defense of Property, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Jul. 1, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com 
/politics/article/Foes-in-Congress-unite-in-defense-of-property-2658728.php) (on file with 
the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL. RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 13. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (demonstrating the arguments made in 
the NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief arguing that the widening of the Public Use Clause has 
had a detrimental impact on those most affected by eminent domain). 
 14. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting) (explaining the harm that the widening of the Public Use Clause has already had 
on minorities and the poor, and predicting that a future expansion of the clause would 
continue such harm). 
 15. See Somin, supra note 10 (explaining that forty-two states have enacted legislation 
protecting property rights after 2005). 
 16. See id. (noting that reform measures were passed soon after Kelo as a response to 
that decision). 
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that fail to provide meaningful change.17  Of those states that have enacted 
reform, Virginia may be seen as a model of success.18  In 2006 the Virginia 
General Assembly resisted comparatively weak, hasty legislation, choosing 
instead to pass more comprehensive reform in 2007.19  On February 13, 
2012, the Virginia General Assembly passed a constitutional amendment to 
protect both public use and just compensation and passed additional 
legislation allowing for access and business losses to be considered in 
determining just compensation.20 These actions make Virginia the only 
state to defeat weak legislation, pass strong comprehensive reform, and then 
pass a second round of even stronger legislation accompanied by a 
constitutional amendment.21 
Though Virginia has seen success in post-Kelo reform, this Note 
argues that Virginia does not offer the perfect model for other states that are 
considering future reform measures. While the results in Virginia may 
appear laudable, they are flawed in a critical area:  Virginia did not include 
those citizens most affected by eminent domain in its reform process.22  
The groups that may have made the strongest historical arguments against 
the broadening of the Takings Clause in Kelo were inactive in the Virginia 
process.23 The legislative leaders who represent those disproportionally 
                                                                                                     
 17. See id. (“Unfortunately, the majority of the new reform laws are likely to be 
ineffective, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the use of eminent domain.”). 
 18. See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text (explaining that Virginia was the 
only state to kill weak reactionary legislation in 2006, pass comprehensive reform in 2007, 
and then pass a constitutional amendment and additional reform legislation). 
 19. See infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text (noting that the legislation 
proposed by Delegate Terrie Suit in 2006 was much less comprehensive than the reform bill 
that became law in 2007). 
 20. See Constitutional Amendment:  Taking or Damaging of Private Property for 
Public Use, S.J. Res. 3, 2012 Leg., 2012 Sess., 2d Reference (Va. 2012) (Floor: 02/13/12 
Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by the Senate (23-Y 16-N), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393SJ0003+SJ0003 (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the Senate of Virginia on 
February 13, 2012)) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 21. See generally Calvert G. Chipchase, Christian K. Adams & Kamaile A. Nichols, A 
State-by-State Survey of Public Use Standards, in EMINENT DOMAIN:  A HANDBOOK OF 
CONDEMNATION LAW 153 (William Scheiderich et al. eds., 2011) (surveying all post-Kelo 
state action and showing that Virginia’s could be seen as the strongest state reform 
measures).  
 22. See discussion infra Part IV.C (explaining that in Virginia those most affected by 
the broadening of the Public Use Clause were not active in reform measures). 
 23. See infra note 248 and accompanying text (explaining that groups that commonly 
advocated for ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent, were absent from the 
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impacted, did not encourage or support reform.24  This Note argues that for 
future eminent domain reform measures to be successful, legislative results 
cannot forsake those most disproportionally affected by eminent domain.25 
Part II of this Note will examine the evolution of the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. It will examine how the clause was first broad-
ened as early as 1798 but was substantially changed in Berman v. Parker, 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and Kelo v. City of New London. Part 
III will focus on the disproportionate impact eminent domain has had on 
racial and ethnic minorities, the indigent, and the elderly. This discussion 
will focus primarily on Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit 
and the arguments outlined in the amicus brief submitted by the NAACP 
and AARP. Part IV will examine the post-Kelo legislative response. It will 
note why Virginia may appear to be a leader in eminent domain reform but 
will then discuss why the state’s model is flawed. Part V will propose a 
stronger model for eminent domain reform and explain why a reuniting of 
“strange bedfellows” is beneficial to the reform process. Part VI concludes 
by supporting continued reform and advocating why the reform process 
should follow a more inclusive model than that seen in Virginia. 
II. The Evolution of the Public Use Clause 
The argument presented in this Note is posited on the assumption that 
the need for post-Kelo reform cannot be fully appreciated without first 
understanding the history of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
which states:  “Nor (shall a person) be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”26  The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
language to mean that “the taking must be for a ‘public use’ and ‘just 
compensation’ must be paid to the owner.”27  From this section of the Fifth 
                                                                                                     
Virginia reform process). 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing how in Virginia many legislators who 
represent those most affected by a widening of the Public Use Clause did not support reform 
measures).  
 25. See discussion infra Part V (proposing a better model for eminent domain reform 
that includes those most affected by a widening of the Public Use Clause). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 27. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–32 (2003) (explaining the 
Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment). 
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Amendment, two critical questions arise:  what constitutes a public use and 
how much compensation is necessary to be just?28  How these questions are 
answered by both the judicial and legislative branches, affects all property 
owners and specifically those property owners who are members of racial 
or ethnic minorities, are elderly, or are economically underprivileged.29 
A. The Early Cases 
As early as 1798, the Court started determining the boundaries of the 
public use doctrine.30  Justice Chase wrote,  
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the 
great first principles  of the social compact, cannot be considered a 
rightful exercise of legislative authority . . . [A] law that takes property 
from A. and gives it to B:  It is against all reason and justice, for a 
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it 
cannot be presumed that they have done it.31 
Since Justice Chase’s statement, the Supreme Court has addressed the 
question of when and for what reason the state can take A’s property and 
transfer it to B numerous times.32 
Very early after the passage of the Bill of Rights, states used eminent 
domain for purposes such as public roads, railroads, and parks.33  In the 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Mary Massaron Ross & Hilary Ann Ballentine, Public Use and Public 
Purpose, in EMINENT DOMAIN A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 1 (William 
Scheiderich et al eds., 2011) (explaining that the broadness of the concept of the public use 
still continues to be a threshold issue in eminent domain law); see also Terry C. Frank, 
Compensation, in EMINENT DOMAIN A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 17 (William 
Scheiderich et al eds., 2011) (explaining that the just compensation issue represents the 
second prong of the major ongoing legal question in eminent domain). 
 29. See Brief of National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
(No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057 at 7 [hereinafter NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief] (stating 
that the burden of eminent domain has, and will, continue to fall disproportionately on racial 
or ethnic minorities, the elderly, and the economically underprivileged). 
 30. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1789) (demonstrating the Court questioning 
the boundaries of the Public Use Clause). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See generally Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Fallbrook 
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158, 164 (1896); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold 
Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) 
(demonstrating the Court's evolving jurisprudence on the public use question). 
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majority of these early takings cases, the public use requirement was not 
called into question.34  The so-called “Mills Acts,” which were among the 
earliest examples of legislation authorizing a taking of private property for 
a private use with public benefit, could be seen as a starting point for the 
broadening of the public use requirement.35 These early 19th century 
statutes stated that mill owners could dam a part of a river if they paid those 
upstream for the flooding damage.36  In the mill cases, the Court first 
started weighing the value of one private property interest against another 
and found the taking of A’s property for B’s benefit was thought to provide 
value not only for B but for all.37  Borrowing from the logic of these 
statues, the Nevada Supreme Court in Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. 
Seawell38  allowed for roads to be condemned for mining purposes; here 
too, as private property was taken for a private use with public economic 
benefit, the court found public use.39  The court rationalized, “the object for 
which private property is to be taken must not only be of great public 
benefit and for the paramount interest of the community, but the necessity 
must exist for the exercise of eminent domain.”40  Richard Epstein, the 
notable property rights scholar, explained in Takings, that these early cases 
work because two requirements are satisfied: necessity and division of the 
surplus.41  The necessity principle states that forced exchanges are to be 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 512 (2005) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting) (explaining that early takings were for uses that were unchallenged as to public 
use). 
 34. See id. (stating that with the early taking cases there was little debate over the 
public use). 
 35. See id. (stating the Mill Acts brought about early Court decisions regarding the 
taking of private property for public use). 
 36. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 170–76 (Harvard University Press 1985) (explaining that with the Mill 
Acts, the owner of a mill could dam a waterway and compensate the owner of property that 
abuts the river if the property were to flood). 
 37. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512 (explaining that party acting as the taker was acting on 
behalf of the public, in that any member of the public could receive equally the benefit of the 
mill). 
 38. See Dayton Gold & Silver Min. Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 395 (1876) (ruling 
that a private mining road can satisfy the public use requirement). 
 39. See id. (finding a public value in a private mining road). 
 40. Id. at  411. 
 41. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 173 (explaining the Court's logic in determining 
when a private taking constituted a public use).  
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limited to those cases where there is some situational necessity.42  The 
division of surplus principle states that the value of the taking must be 
redistributed to all those in the community, including the owner who is the 
subject of the take.43  Thus the benefit or value must be distributed to all 
including A, the original property owner.44 
Another early case that demonstrates the Supreme Court’s ability to 
weigh the respective value of two private properties in a takings issue is 
Miller v. Schoene.45  There the state cut down ornamental cedar trees 
without compensating the owner because cedar trees were host to a 
harbored fungus, which could be dangerous to local apple trees.46  In that 
case, for the first time, the Supreme Court blurred the state’s police power 
with the public use, stating, “upon the destruction of one class of property 
in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of 
greater value to the public.”47  From cases like these the idea of the com-
parison of values was born:  the government can take A’s property for B’s 
purpose, if B provides greater good to the public.48 
B. Berman v. Parker 
The modern debate about the boundaries of the Public Use Clause and 
whose role it is to define what types of takings constitute public use is at the 
center of the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo trilogy.49  In Berman v. Parker the Court 
drastically widened the public use requirement, allowing it to be satisfied 
by a Washington D.C. plan for “comprehensive redevelopment” or urban 
renewal.50  The plan did not target specific homes or businesses that were 
                                                                                                     
 42. See id. (explaining how in viewing a private taking for a public use, the Court 
determines what satisfies the necessity requirement). 
 43. See id. (“The basic theory of public use demands that in forced exchanges the 
surplus must be evenly divided.”). 
 44. See id.  
 45. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (showing that the Court weighed 
the value to the public of apple verses cedar trees). 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11 (stating that the Court commits a fundamental error 
when it becomes preoccupied with the value question). 
 49. See id. at 83 (explaining that in Kelo the broad language of Berman and Midkiff 
was used as the Court again tried to determine the boundaries of public use).  
 50. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (demonstrating a public use in urban 
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not well cared for; instead, the plan called for the taking of many houses 
and businesses that were in zones where there was vast blight and urban 
decay regardless of the condition of those specific properties.51  The takings 
resulting from Berman ultimately displaced an entire ethnic community.52 
In 1953, prior to the decision in Berman, a three-judge panel in 
Scheider v. District of Columbia53 held that “private property could be 
taken to abate slum conditions, present or reasonably expected, even if the 
property thereafter was conveyed into private hands.”54  But in Scheider, 
the District Court for the District of Columbia noted, “One man’s land 
cannot be seized by the Government and sold to another man merely in 
order that the purchaser may build upon it a better house or house which 
meets the Government’s idea of what is appropriate or well-designed.”55  
Mr. Berman, the losing plaintiff in the case, fell in between the two rules 
from Scheider; he was the owner of a non-blighted store, located in a 
blighted district.56  Mr. Berman’s store was taken and immediately trans-
ferred to another private owner in its exact condition.57 This was a further 
departure from a strict interpretation of the public use requirement, 
applying the Mills Act test, not only was the necessity of the taking 
questionable, but Mr. Berman received arguably no public value.58  Even if 
the housing authority were to comprehensively revitalize the neighborhood, 
Mr. Berman received no value share for the direct transferal of his 
property.59 The Supreme Court unanimously justified the public use by 
                                                                                                     
renewal). 
 51. See id. (showing that an individual property did not have to be blighted to fall 
within a blighted zone). 
 52. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting) (“Over 97 percent of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the 
‘slum-clearance’ project upheld by this Court in Berman were black.”). 
 53. See Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953) (holding that 
a blight taking can satisfy the public use requirement).  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 178–79 (stating Mr. Berman’s store itself was not 
blighted, but the store was located in a blighted zone). 
 57. See id. (explaining that Berman is an unusual case as the property was left in its 
original condition and transferred to another private owner). 
 58. See id. (explaining that Mr. Berman did not receive a portion of the shared value 
of the taking). 
 59. See id. (“But the situation is not improved when slum property is converted into 
public housing projects, where financial and other eligibility restrictions are imposed upon 
candidates for rental.”). 
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deciding that the taking fell under the police power.60  The Court stated that 
the redevelopment plan was comprehensive, not targeting a specific 
property owner, and the conditions of the condemned properties, as a 
whole, were so poor that this police power was necessary for the public 
good.61 
Berman clearly signaled the Supreme Court’s willingness to defer the 
public use question to the legislature.62 Setting out the Court’s role in 
determining public use, Berman established that, “the role of the judiciary 
in determining whether that power being exercised is for public purpose is 
an extremely narrow one.”63 To satisfy the public use requirement, the 
Court simply read the text of the legislation: 
Owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out, and 
other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with 
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use of 
buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to 
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare, and it is hereby declared 
to be the policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare 
of the inhabitants of the seat of Government by eliminating all such 
injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate 
for the purpose.64 
In giving almost complete deference to the legislature, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the legislative finding of public use, stating, “If those who 
govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be 
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that 
stands in the way.”65 
While the Court relegated to the legislature almost complete autonomy 
in finding and determining public use, it additionally conceded that the best 
public use could actually be for use by another private property owner.66  
The Court stated, “The public end may be well or better served through an 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that because of the mass 
blight produced unsafe conditions, the police power was necessary). 
 61. See id. (explaining the degree of the blighted property allowed for the police 
power). 
 62. See id. at 32 (“Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature 
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 28. 
 65. Id. at 33. 
 66. See id. at 34 (explaining that in addition to passing the public use question to the 
legislature, the Court clearly stated that public use could be found with a private owner). 
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agency of private enterprise than through a department of government—or 
so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the 
sole method of promoting purposes of community redevelopment pro-
jects.”67  Where there is a well-kept property or even a well-kept street or 
city block in a larger area deemed to be blighted, the Court stated that if the 
non-blighted owner “were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs 
on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the 
public interest, integrated plans for the redevelopment would suffer 
greatly.”68 Lastly, in granting far more comparative value to the Just 
Compensation Clause than the Public Use Clause the Court states, “The 
rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just 
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the 
taking.”69  Thus, the Court comes close to concluding that the Fifth Amend-
ment right is protected almost exclusively by just compensation.70 
Prior to Berman the Court allowed the legislature to use the police 
power to value uses comparatively.71  After Berman, the Court yields al-
most complete deference to the legislature in determining the public use, 
allowing for a private to private taking if it is part of a larger redevelopment 
scheme, and permits non-blighted property to be taken if the taking is 
helpful to the larger redevelopment plan.72 
C. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 
The Supreme Court in Berman took these major steps in reshaping and 
broadening public use jurisprudence, only to broaden the Public Use Clause 
further in 1980 with Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.73  In Midkiff 
                                                                                                     
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 35.  
 69. Id. at 36. 
 70. See id. (explaining that the rights of property owners are protected when the owner 
receives just compensation). 
 71. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (showing that the Court exercised 
the police power when using the Takings Clause by making a comparison of the value of 
two types of trees). 
 72. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 73. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (stating that the 
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 was constitutional as the condemnations of lessor’s 
property and the subsequent distribution of that property to lessees satisfies a public 
purpose). 
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local landowners questioned whether the Public Use Clause was violated by 
Hawaii’s Land Reform Act of 1967.74 This act created a “land 
condemnation scheme whereby title in real property was taken from lessors 
and transferred to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land 
ownership.”75  In this system, the Hawaii Housing Authority could directly 
condemn the private property of the owner and transfer it to the lessee, 
without the lessee ever leaving the property.76  In identifying the public 
purpose, the Court found that it was: 
to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly 
traceable to their [Hawaiian] monarchs. The land oligopoly has, 
according to the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the 
normal functioning of the State’s residential land market and forced 
thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land 
underneath their homes.77 
In Midkiff, Justice O’Conner, writing for the Court, stated that such a 
use did not violate the public use requirement, which “is coterminous with 
the scope of the sovereign’s police powers.”78  The Court, citing Berman, 
stated that the role the Court plays in reviewing a legislature’s judgment 
about what constitutes a public use is “an extremely narrow one.”79  
Deference should be given to the legislature’s public use determination, 
“until it is shown to involve an impossibility.”80  The Court summarized its 
position of reviewing the Public Use Clause by stating that it “will not 
substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes 
‘public use’ unless the use is palpably without reasonable foundation.”81  
Answering any question of whether property must be used exclusively by 
the public, the Court stated, “The mere fact that property taken outright by 
                                                                                                     
 74. See id. (showing that the petitioners filed suit asking that the act be declared 
unconstitutional). 
 75. See id. at 233 (explaining that under the condemnation scheme real title for the 
property transfers from the owner who is the lessor). 
 76. See id. (noting that the lessee who receives title to the property never has to leave 
the occupied property). 
 77. Id. at 241–42. 
 78. Id. at 230. 
 79. See id. at 240 (1984) (stating the role the Court will take in determining whether 
public use has been satisfied) (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
 80. See id. (stating that great deference will be given to the legislature in determining 
public use) (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)). 
 81. Id. at 241 (citing United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 
(1896). 
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eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries 
does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.”82  The 
Court ultimately held that the Act was allowable because it was “rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose.”83  In Berman the Court granted 
deference to the legislature to find public use in a massive redevelopment 
plan while private commercial property was taken and given to other 
private commercial users, declaring that its role in determining public use is 
extremely narrow.84  In Midkiff the Court granted deference to the legis-
lature to find public use in the need to control “a perceived economic 
oligopoly” owning too much property that was originally owned by the 
Kamehmeha Hawaiian royal family.85  These cases left a question for the 
Court in Kelo to answer: When, if ever, will a legislative determination of 
public use not be upheld?86 
D. Kelo v. City of New London 
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court was asked to decide if 
Susette Kelo and fourteen other landowners could be forced from their 
properties when the city of New London, Connecticut acting as the 
condemnor, found a public use in a comprehensive development plan that 
did not specify the future uses of the properties being acquired.87 
The Kelo Court, following precedent set by Berman and Midkiff, 
upheld “longstanding deference to the legislature.”88 In reaching its 
decision that the public use requirement was satisfied, the Supreme Court in 
Kelo first recognized that a pellucid shift had occurred in public use 
                                                                                                     
 82. Id. at 243–44. 
 83. Id. at 241. 
 84. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that the role of the judiciary 
will be very narrow in determining if a use deemed by the legislature to be a public use 
satisfies the requirement). 
 85. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 82–3 (explaining how the majority of the Court 
found a public use in Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff). 
 86. See id. (noting that Berman and Hawaii Housing Authority provide a backdrop for 
when comprehensive development satisfies the public use requirement). 
 87. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) (stating the 
background behind the public use question in the case). 
 88. See id. at 469 (stating that the Court will define public use broadly and will 
continue in its practice of granting deference to the legislature). 
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jurisprudence.89  In noting that the Court now rejects any literal requirement 
for public use, Justice Stevens explained that the narrow “use by the public” 
definition has eroded over time.90  He wrote, “Not only was the ‘use by the 
public’ test difficult to administer . . . but it proved to be impractical given 
the diverse and always evolving needs of society.”91  Stevens found public 
purpose satisfied through the collective macro project, which both increased 
jobs and increased tax revenue.92  Stressing the Court’s strong deference to 
the legislature, Stevens wrote, “For more than a century, our public use 
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in 
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public 
needs justify the use of the taking power.”93 
Specifically addressing the question of whether the forcible transfer of 
a property from one private owner to another private owner constituted a 
public use, Stevens wrote, “Quite simply, the government’s pursuit of a 
public purpose will often benefit individual private parties.”94  However, 
the Court did note some limit on a private-for-private taking, allowing only 
those takings which are part of a “carefully considered development 
plan.”95  Novel to Kelo, the petitioners argued that for there to be a public 
use there should at least be a reasonable certainty that the public benefit 
would actually occur.96  The Court rejected this requirement, in part be-
cause it would “represent a departure from precedent.”97  The Kelo Court, 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. at 482 (stating that the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved overtime with 
respect to public use). 
 90. See id. at 480 (showing that prior to the Court’s ruling in Strickley v. Highland Boy 
Gold Mining Co., a narrower standard for public use was used). 
 91. See id. at 469, 479 (explaining why the Court no longer uses the “use-by-the-
public” test). 
 92. See id. at 469–70 (explaining that collectively an increase in tax revenue, job 
growth, and general economic rejuvenation will constitute a public use). 
 93. Id. at 483. 
 94. Id. at 485. 
 95. See id. at 478 (explaining that the City of New London’s plan satisfies the public 
use requirement because it is part of a carefully considered plan as compared to an 
individual private-for-private taking that is not part of a greater scheme). 
 96. See id. at 487 (“Alternatively, petitioners maintain that for takings of this kind we 
should require a ‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public benefits will actually 
accrue.”). 
 97. Id.  
ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITIES 87 
 
closely following the Berman doctrine, chose to “decline to second-guess 
the wisdom and means the city has selected to effectuate its plan.”98 
The Kelo decision left property owners vulnerable in any state where 
public use was not well defined, as the Court would uphold the taking of 
one’s private property for another private use, even if there were not a 
reasonable certainty that a public use would occur.99  Theoretically, under 
this decision, as long as just compensation would be paid to A, A’s private 
property could be taken by the State and given to private property owner B, 
even though there would be no guarantee of public benefit in this 
transfer.100 
III. Eminent Domain and its Impact on Ethnic and Racial Minorities, the 
Indigent, and the Elderly 
The relaxed reading of the Public Use Clause is problematic to all 
landowners, as it introduces major instability to concepts underlying basic 
property rights.101  While the Supreme Court has allowed the State to de-
termine what qualifies as a public use, history shows that ethnic and racial 
minorities, the elderly, and the poor are more often subjected to ques-
tionable takings.102 
A. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit infamously demon-
strates the danger minority groups can face when the Court allows the state 
                                                                                                     
 98. Id. at 469−70. 
 99. See supra notes 69–98 and accompanying text (explaining how the ruling in Kelo 
could affect a property owner who lives in a state where reform measures were not passed). 
 100. See supra notes 69–98 and accompanying text (explaining how the ruling in Kelo 
could affect a property owner who lives in a state where reform measures were not passed). 
 101. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 17 (stating that people are more likely to want to 
live in a society where they have secured understandings about their future liberties).  
 102. See MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, EMINENT DOMAIN AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS: 
WHAT IS THE PRICE OF THE COMMONS 1–2 (stating that since slavery, African-Americans 
have always been threatened disproportionately with legalized takings); see also The Civil 
Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse:  Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights 5 (2011) (testimony of Ilya Somin, Assoc. Professor of Law, George Mason 
Univ.) (stating that as a result of historical political weakness, African-Americans have been 
the victims of blight and economic development takings).  
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to determine the boundaries of the public use requirement on an ad hoc 
basis.103  Poletown is a case similar to Berman in that an entire ethnic 
community was displaced because of a taking with a questionable public 
use.104  The case demonstrates perhaps the State’s most offensive use of the 
power of eminent domain against an ethnic community.105  Poletown was 
the name of a section of Detroit inhabited by a large, predominately Polish 
community.106  In 1980 General Motors Corporation informed the city of 
Detroit that it was planning to relocate two of its Cadillac plants to Dallas, 
Texas.107  Due to the threat of losing approximately 6,000 jobs, the Detroit 
Economic Development Corporation met with General Motors to inquire 
into specifically what type of parcel the industry would need in order to 
prevent this relocation.108  Upon such identification, the taking was al-
lowed, forcing the removal of hundreds of Polish families from their 
neighborhood and causing $200 million in property to be transferred to the 
General Motors Corporation for only $8 million.109  To find public use, the 
Michigan Supreme Court in Poletown employed a balancing test, de-
termining that “whatever the losses in subjective value to the private 
property owners in this cohesive economic neighborhood, they are offset by 
the benefits that accrue to the workers who continue in their jobs, the social 
benefits to other firms, the unemployment compensation that is not drawn 
                                                                                                     
 103. See David K. Bowersox, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain:  Poor 
Relation to the Constitution’s "Poor Relation," in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW:  TAKINGS, 
COMPENSATION, AND BENEFITS 255, 268–80 (Alan T. Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski 
eds., 2d ed. 2006) (stating that the Court found public use by deferring to the condemnor, 
citing the taking was for a public purpose). 
 104. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29 (stating that both the takings in 
Poletown and in Berman destroyed ethic communities). 
 105. See id. (commenting specifically about the abuse of the Polish neighborhood in 
Poletown). 
 106. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 470 
(Mich. 1981) (stating that the community subject of the take was a thriving ethnic 
neighborhood). 
 107. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Public Use of Private Property:  A Dual-Constraint 
Theory of Efficient Governmental Taking, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION:  
LAW AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 186 (Nicholas Mercuro ed. 1992) 
(showing the factual process by which Detroit found public use). 
 108. See id. (explaining the steps the City of Detroit and the Detroit Economic 
Development Corporation took to entice the General Motors Corporation to stay in the City 
of Detroit). 
 109. See id. (explaining the final package that the City of Detroit offered in order to 
persuade the General Motors Corporation not to leave Detroit). 
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out of the public fisc, [sic] and so on.”110  In the taking, Detroit, aided by 
General Motors, defined the public value as a retention and increase of jobs 
to the city.111  However, the landowners who lost their homes, their neigh-
bors, and their community did not benefit proportionally in this value 
sharing.112  Poletown is a direct example of what can and does happen 
when local elected officials are left as the final and only guardians of 
property rights.113  Local leaders took private property from many private 
citizens, who collectively formed an ethnic neighborhood, and gave it to a 
major business, in what the leaders deemed as a comparatively better use of 
the property.114  Because there was a loose legislative restriction on what 
constituted a public use, the Michigan Supreme Court found that this use, in 
which A asked the sovereign to take B’s property and redistribute to A, 
qualified.115 
B.  An Empirical Analysis: Arguments for Those Most Affected 
Poletown and Berman are vivid examples of the disproportionate 
impact eminent domain may have on ethnic and racial minorities, the 
elderly, and the indigent,116  but the takings of two neighborhoods do little 
to validate the claim of a disproportionate impact. The statistical reality is 
that between three and four million Americans have been forced from their 
homes by eminent domain since World War II.117  The majority of those 
                                                                                                     
 110. See id. at 187 (proposing a balancing test that the court used to find public use in 
this private-for-private taking).  
 111. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 471 (explaining that retaining and adding jobs was 
important to economic growth and therefore satisfied the public use requirement). 
 112. See Ulen, supra note 107, at 186 (citing that the Poles in the neighborhood said 
that they would be unable to relocate to another area to form a similar type of community). 
 113. See Michael Rikon, Bulldozers at Your Doorstep: The Debris of Kelo v. City of 
New London, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW: TAKINGS, COMPENSATION, AND BENEFITS 7 
(Alan T. Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski eds., 2d ed.) (explaining how a broad reading 
of the Public Use Clause allowed the taking in Poletown to occur). 
 114. See id.  
 115. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460 
(Mich. 1981) ("Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and 
significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature."). 
 116. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29 (explaining that Berman and 
Poletown both demonstrate how eminent domain affects ethnic and racial minorities). 
 117. See Beito, infra note 145 (explaining the harm that eminent domain policies have 
had on ethnic and racial minorities since World War II). 
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whose property was taken were ethnic minorities.118  In the years between 
1949 and 1973 alone, by using eminent domain for the purposes of blight 
eradication or economic development, 2,532 projects were carried out in 
992 cities that displaced one million people, two-thirds of them African-
American.119  At that period, African-Americans were five times more 
likely to be displaced than they should have been in their numbers (based 
upon their representation) in the population.120  Takings in ethnic areas for 
the purpose of blight eradication was so prevalent, many dubbed it “Negro 
removal.”121 
C. The Amicus Brief 
The Kelo case gave groups that had disproportionately suffered the 
burdens of eminent domain, a platform on which they could express their 
grievances and argue for the necessity of a narrow reading of the Public 
Use Clause.122  It has been noted that, “Few protested the Kelo ruling more 
ardently than the NAACP.”123  In its amicus brief in Kelo, the NAACP 
along with several other parties including the AARP, the Hispanic Alliance 
of Atlantic County, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 
posited that ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent are not 
just affected more frequently, but also are affected to a greater degree by 
the eminent domain abuses.124  The brief is important because it not only 
clearly states the position of both the NAACP and the AARP regarding the 
                                                                                                     
 118. See id. 
 119. See FULLILOVE, supra note 102, at 2 (citing the number of African-American 
properties taken between 1949 and 1973 as a result of a non-restrictive reading of the public 
use requirement and the Federal Housing Act of 1949). 
 120. See id. (stating the statistical disadvantage African-Americans faced with takings 
in the years the Federal Housing Act was in place). 
 121. See Beito, infra note 145 (“It was Berman that enabled the massive urban renewal 
condemnations of later decades, which many critics dubbed ‘Negro removal’ because they 
too tended to target African-Americans.”). 
 122. See id. (stating that ethnic and racial minority groups used the publicity of Kelo to 
express past injustices committed through the less restrictive reading of the public use 
requirement). 
 123. See id. (stating the lasting legal reality of Kelo v. City of New London). 
 124. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *12 (“The very circumstances 
that put minorities and the elderly at increased risk of being subjected to eminent domain 
power also leave those groups less able to deal with the consequences when such takings 
occur.”). 
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widening of the Public Use Clause, but it also masterfully notes the 
historical impact takings have had on these subject groups.125 
After chastising the Connecticut Supreme Court’s then broad 
interpretation of the Public Use Clause, calling it “meaningless,”126  the 
brief explained the unfortunate history certain groups have had with 
eminent domain.127 The NAACP explained that the government “had 
[been] operating through housing and the highway machine implemented 
policies to segregate and maintain the insulation of poor, minority, and 
otherwise outcast populations.”128  In Baltimore, of the 10,000 families that 
were displaced by such housing and road projects, ninety percent were 
African-American.129 Approximately 1,600 African-Americans neighbor-
hoods in total were destroyed by takings projects when the public use was 
not restrictively defined.130 
Explaining how minorities have previously been impacted disp-
roportionately, the brief noted a specific quotation that demonstrates the 
past mentality of certain condemnors: 
We went through the black section between Minneapolis and St. Paul 
about four blocks wide and we took out the home of every black man in 
that city. And woman and child. In both those cities, practically. It ain’t 
there anymore, is it? Nice neat black neighborhood, you know, with 
their churches and all and we gave them about $6,000 a house and 
turned them loose on society.131 
Evidencing the disproportionate impact of the widening of the public 
use, the brief further argued that whenever there are takings for economic 
development, those who live in neighborhoods with a high concentration of 
                                                                                                     
 125. See id. passim (citing historical cases and statistics of how ethnic and racial 
minorities have a disproportionate number of takings). 
 126. See id. at 6 (explaining that if the public use requirement is fulfilled by the 
reorganization of any economic benefit, the requirement becomes meaningless). 
 127. See id. at 7–8 (citing how African-Americans and other racial minorities have had 
their homes and neighborhoods destroyed by abusive takings). 
 128. Id. at 8 (quoting Kevin Douglas Kuswa, Suburbification, Segregation, and the 
Consolidation of the Highway Machine, 3 J.L. SOC'Y 31, 53 (2002)). 
 129. See id. (demonstrating that minority families in Baltimore suffered widespread and 
disproportionate takings abuse) (quoting BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, 
DOWNTOWN, INC.:  HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 29 (1989)). 
 130. See id. (citing the total number of African-American neighborhoods destroyed by 
eminent domain) (citing MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK:  HOW TEARING UP 
CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 17 (2004)). 
 131. Id. at 8. 
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racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly will be disproportionately 
affected.132  Further, the brief discussed New Jersey cases, where forty 
percent of the city’s Latino community lived in a zone targeted for 
economic development.133  In Mt. Holly Township, New Jersey, “officials 
have targeted for economic redevelopment a neighborhood in which the 
percentage of African-American residents (44%) is twice that of the entire 
Township and nearly triple that of Burlington County, and in which the 
percentage of Hispanic residents (22%) is more than double that of all Mt. 
Holly Township, and more than five times that of the county.”134 
Both the NAACP in its amicus brief and Professor Somin, a property 
rights scholar who focuses on eminent domain reform, posited that these 
groups suffer disproportionately because they have historically lacked a 
strong political voice.135  Even with a taking under a narrowly defined 
public use requirement, when there is a large condemnation project, the 
condemnor searching for property is economically incentivized to take the 
cheapest property possible that would still allow for the goals of the 
project.136  When the property owner who lives in a poorer ethnic neighbor-
hood does become subject to a taking, the odds are stacked against that 
person.137  They have fewer resources with which to lobby their case, they 
are often less politically connected, and have less access to justice.138 
                                                                                                     
 132. See id. at 9 (explaining that even without nefarious motives on the part of the 
condemnor, those who live in neighborhoods with high concentrations of ethnic and racial 
minorities will suffer disproportionately more eminent domain abuse) (citing Dana Berliner, 
Condemnations for Private Parties Destroy Black Neighborhoods and Out with the Old: 
Elderly Residents are Prime Targets for Eminent Domain Abuses, in PUBLIC POWER, 
PRIVATE GAIN:  A FIVE-YEAR, STATE BY STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 102, 185 (2003)). 
 133. See id. at 10 (explaining how condemnors near Atlantic City, New Jersey are 
planning a condemnation project that affects forty percent of the locality’s Latino 
community). 
 134. Id.  
 135. See id. at 22 (“Allowing ‘public use’ to include ‘economic development’ renders 
the eminent domain power open to abuse to the particular disadvantage of those, such as 
amici, who lack economic or political power.”); see also The Civil Rights Implications of 
Eminent Domain Abuse:  Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 5 (2011) 
(testimony of Ilya Somin, Assoc. Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.) (explaining that 
ethnic and racial minority groups have been victimized, sometimes by racial prejudice and 
sometimes by relative political weakness). 
 136. See id. at 14 (explaining how it is in the government’s interest to take lower cost 
housing). 
 137. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *28 (explaining how the 
poorer property owner in an ethnic area is given less of a voice in the decision making 
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NAACP and AARP’s disproportionate impact argument in their 
Amicus Brief did not go unnoticed by Justice Thomas.139  In his dissent in 
Kelo, after tracing the evolution of the Takings Clause, he devoted an entire 
section of his opinion to noting the disproportionate impact that eminent 
domain has had on certain groups.140  Justice Thomas reminded the Court 
that minority communities have been targeted by eminent domain, as he 
cited statistics concerning urban renewal and blight takings. Finally, he 
reminded the Court that over 97% of those forcibly removed in Berman 
were African-American.141  With respect to the harm of the Kelo decision 
on those already disproportionately impacted, he wrote “Regrettably, the 
predictable consequence of the Court’s decision will be to exacerbate these 
effects.”142 
IV. The Post-Kelo Legislative Response 
In Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo, the Court has stated that it is the duty of 
the legislature to determine what constitutes public use, and the judiciary 
will have a very narrow role in reviewing that determination.143  Due to the 
public interest generated in the wake of Kelo, most states have responded 
by passing legislation, attempting to better define “public use.”144 
                                                                                                     
process). 
 138. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049 
(1970) (discussing that the legal problems the indigent face are different than legal problems 
for the more affluent because the poorer person does not have the financial means to 
advocate his position). 
 139. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the harm that the widening of the Public Use Clause has already had 
on minorities and the poor, and predicting that a future expansion of the clause would 
continue such harm). 
 140. See id. (showing the disproportionate impact that Justice Thomas wrote about in 
the Kelo dissent). 
 141. See id. (stating the disproportionate impact the Berman taking had on minorities). 
 142. See id. (demonstrating Justice Thomas’s assumptions about the future 
disproportionality of takings). 
 143. See id. at 500 (stating that the role of the judiciary will be very narrow in 
determining if a use deemed by the legislature to be a public use satisfies the requirement 
(citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)) (quoting Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954))). 
 144. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining that the majority of states have 
enacted constitutional or statutory reforms to better define the limits of the public use 
requirement).  
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A. The Rush to Reform: Revisited 
From 2005 to 2008, forty-two states enacted new laws that limit the 
power of eminent domain.145  However, this response, seemingly positive 
for the groups disproportionately affected, has drawn criticism for being 
drafted in a rushed fashion in effort to quiet public outrage stemming from 
Kelo.146  Scholars who have studied the 2006 and 2007 reform laws argue 
that they are “ineffective, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the 
use of eminent domain.”147  Professor Somin, who has testified to Congress 
about these measures, notes of the states that have enacted them, “Many of 
them forbid takings that transfer property to private parties for ‘economic 
development,’ but allow virtually identical condemnations to continue 
under other names.”148 For example, numerous states continue to allow 
“blight” condemnations under definitions of blight so broad that virtually 
any area qualifies.149  As a result, their benefit to the groups that have been 
disproportionately impacted is not as strong as it may have been per-
ceived.150  For example, nineteen states have outlawed takings for solely for 
economic development but have allowed takings for blight, with blight 
being so poorly defined that almost any property would qualify.151  
Professor Somin cites California and Texas as examples of states that 
passed flawed post-Kelo measures.152 
                                                                                                     
 145. See David T. Beito & Ilya Somin, Op-Ed., Battle over Eminent Domain is Another 
Civil Rights Issue, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.cato.org/pub_ 
display.php?pubid=9361 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (explaining that since the Kelo decision, 
all but eight states have enacted some type of eminent domain reform) (on file with WASH. 
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 146. See Somin, supra note 10 (“Unfortunately, the majority of the new reform laws are 
likely to be inefficient, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the use of eminent 
domain.”). 
 147. See id. (stating that a large percentage of the 2006 and 2007 post-Kelo eminent 
domain reform is ineffective).  
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. (stating that blight statutes are meaningless in some states because they can 
refer to blighted zones). 
 150. See id. (stating that the promised benefit of reform measures was not actually 
realized once the measures were passed). 
 151. See Beito, supra note 145 (explaining that there is little impact with reform that 
better defines taking for economic development when the same property can be taken under 
the guide of alleviating blight). 
 152. See Somin, supra note 10 (citing examples of states that proposed remedial reform 
that proved to be uncomprehensive). 
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California is an example of a state that acted quickly to pass post-Kelo 
reform, of little actual value.153 The California Court of Appeals in 
Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes154  explained that the public use clause 
was originally narrowly restricted, but was later broadened to include 
‘public purpose.’  The Court of Appeals stated, “The idea now is that the 
taking of the property itself, as distinguished from the subsequent use of 
that property, may be required in the public interest.”155  While the Cali-
fornia state court appears to use jurisprudence similar to that which the 
United States Supreme Court used in the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo trilogy, the 
legislature sought to narrow public use in 2008 with Proposition 99, which 
was intended to prohibit private residential takings for a private use.156  
However the actual text of the amendment states, 
(b) The State and local governments are prohibited from acquiring by 
eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of 
conveying it to a private person.157 
 
(c) Subdivision (b) of this section does not apply when State or local 
government exercises the power of eminent domain for the purpose of 
protecting public health and safety; preventing serious, repeated 
criminal activity; responding to an emergency; or remedying 
environmental contamination that poses a threat to public health and 
safety.158 
 
(d) Subdivision (b) of this section does not apply when State or local 
government exercises the power of eminent domain for the purpose of 
acquiring private property for a public work or improvement.159 
                                                                                                     
 153. See id. 
 154. Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (citing 
Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953)). 
 155. See CALVERT G. CHIPCHASE, ET AL., STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF PUBLIC USE 
STANDARDS IN EMINENT DOMAIN:  A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 153, 157 (citing 
Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953)) (explaining how the 
California state courts interpreted the public use requirement before post-Kelo legislative 
reform) (quoting Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954)). 
 156. See id. (explaining that Proposition 99 was California’s post-Kelo public use 
reform measure). 
 157. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19, cl. b. 
 158. Id. at cl. c. 
 159. Id. at cl. d. 
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The amendment is particularly weak in redefining public use, as it 
essentially only limits private residential takings for a private use, when the 
state or locality is not acting with the goal of public improvement.160  Put 
another way, the amendment could read:  a private-to-private residential 
taking cannot occur when there is absolutely no public purpose.161  Under 
this legislation, blight takings are still acceptable as are any takings where 
there is purported public improvement.162  This type of “reform legislation” 
offers almost no benefit to those groups who are disproportionately affected 
by eminent domain.163 
Texas is another example of a state that rushed post-Kelo reform.164  
The Texas state constitution holds that “[n]o person’s property shall be 
taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate 
compensation.”165  To better define the public use term, just weeks after the 
Kelo decision was announced, the legislature enacted Chapter Number 
2005-1 into law. The law purportedly protects taking of private property 
stating: 
b)  A governmental or private entity may not take private  property 
through the use of eminent domain if the taking: (1)  confers a private 
benefit on a particular private  party through the use of the property; (2)  
is for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a  private benefit 
on a particular private party;  or (3)  is for economic development 
purposes, unless the economic development is a secondary purpose 
resulting from  municipal community development or municipal urban 
renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society 
from slum or blighted areas.166 
                                                                                                     
 160. See id. ("[T]his section does not apply when State or local government exercises 
the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring private property for a public work 
or improvement."). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See, e.g., Beito, supra note 145 (explaining that in many states that enacted post-
Kelo reform restricting takings for economic development, often times the same property 
can be taken under the guise of alleviating blight). 
 163. See Somin, supra note 10 ("Unfortunately, the majority of the new reform laws are 
likely to be ineffective, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the use of eminent 
domain."). 
 164. See id. (citing examples of proposed state remedial reform that did not prove to be 
comprehensive). 
 165. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 166. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001. 
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Absent from the Texas post-Kelo reform statute is language limiting 
the taking to only that property required for the project.167  Therefore, the 
Texas law would allow a condemnor to condemn a large parcel for a road 
and then transfer any access property not used for the road to a private 
owner.168 Texas may have thought itself to be progressive in protecting 
property rights.  However, as the act allows for property to be transferred to 
a private party for an economic use, the reform is comparatively weak.169 
B. Virginia – A Seemingly Successful Model 
Compared with the legislative reforms of states like California and 
Texas, Virginia’s reform laws are comprehensive.170  In 2006, the Virginia 
General Assembly narrowly thwarted an attempt at comparatively weak 
reactionary legislation similar to that enacted by Texas.171 In 2007, the 
General Assembly passed a bill that defined public use, specifying that an 
increased tax basis or economic development were not to be considered in 
making such a determination.172  On February 14, 2012, both houses of the 
Virginia General Assembly passed additional legislation that allowed for 
lost access and lost business profits that stem from an eminent domain 
taking to be compensable.173  Just one day earlier, February 13, 2012, both 
houses passed an amendment to the Virginia Constitution that states that 
                                                                                                     
 167. See id. (showing that there is no language in the reform law that limits a taking to 
only that amount of property that is necessary for a project). 
 168. See id. (explaining how the Texas reform law still allows for abusive takings). 
 169. See generally CALVERT G. CHIPCHASE, ET AL., A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF 
PUBLIC USE STANDARDS IN EMINENT DOMAIN:  A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 153 
(surveying all post-Kelo state action and showing that Texas could be seen as comparatively 
weak in its reform measures).  
 170. Compare supra notes 154–156, 162, and accompanying text (explaining the 
reforms law enacted in Texas and California), with infra notes 172–192 and accompanying 
text (explaining the comprehensiveness of Virginia’s reform laws). 
 171. See H.R. 94, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=061&typ=bil&val=hb94 (showing that the 
original language of the first reform bill was defeated in the House of Delegates). 
 172. See H.R. 2954, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HB2954 (showing that stronger reform 
was passed in 2007). 
 173. See S. 437, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=121&typ=bil&val=sb437 (showing that the 
General Assembly passed a bill to make lost access and business losses compensable).  
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property rights are fundamental, protects just compensation, and further 
defines public use.174 
Virginia, like many other states, was quick to act to remedy the Kelo 
decision.175  On December 19, 2005, less than six months after the Supreme 
Court ruled in Kelo, Virginia Delegate Terrie Suit pre-filed House Bill 
94.176  The bill was Virginia’s first attempt at eminent domain reform.177  
The bill stated, “Public uses shall not include the taking or damage [sic] of 
private property through the exercise of the power of eminent domain if the 
primary purpose is the enhancement of tax revenues.”178  It also allowed 
that if property is taken for “eminent domain for public uses and is not for 
the primary purpose of enhancement of tax revenues,” the property could 
then be conveyed to certain private persons or entities.179  Following a con-
tentious floor debate, Delegate Johnny Joannou offered an amendment, 
which struck the previous Suite language from the bill.180  Joannou argued 
                                                                                                     
 174. See SJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging to Private Property for 
Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by 
the Senate (23-Y 16-N), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393S 
J0003+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the 
Senate of Virginia on Sept. 9, 2012).  See also HJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or 
Damaging to Private Property for Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 House: 
Vote: Adoption (80-Y 18-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0 
666+HJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the 
Virginia House of Delegates February 13, 2012.);  see also HB1035 Eminent Domain: 
Definition of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation.  Floor: 02/14/12: 
House: Vote: Passage (77-Y 22-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+ 
vot+HV0780+HB1035 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits 
bill passed the House of Delegates on February 14, 2012); see also SB 437 Eminent 
Domain; Definitions of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation.  Floor: 
02/14/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Passed Senate (23-Y, 17-N) http://leg1 
.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+ SV0408SB0437+SB0437 (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill passed the Senate of Virginia on February 
14, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).  
 175. See H.B. 94 Eminent Domain; Definition of Public Uses. Terrie L. Suit, 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=061&typ=bil&val=hb94, (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (showing that Virginia quickly responded to the Kelo decision by enacting reform 
legislation) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 176. See id. (showing Delegate Terrie Suit prefiled H.B. 94 on Dec. 19, 2005). 
 177. See id. (showing the date of the proposed bill for the 2006 session, which would be 
first session after Kelo). 
 178. H.B. 94, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+ful+HB94EH1.  
 179. Id. 
 180. See Kelo Protection:  A Choice of “Two Paths” (Google Video 2006) http:// 
video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3237745645661904619 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
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that the “primary purpose” language left far too much room to the con-
demnors to condemn a property for one use and then allow the remainder of 
the property to be turned over to a private interest for a private use.181  
Delegate Joannou’s proposed amendment stated, 
In determining whether a use constitutes a public use, public benefits or 
potential public benefits including economic development or private 
development, an increase in the tax base, tax revenues, employment or 
general economic health and welfare shall not be considered.182 
Jeremy Hopkins, who exclusively practices eminent domain law in 
Virginia, noted in The Real Story of Eminent Domain in Virginia that, at the 
time, Delegate Joannou’s “proposed bill represents one of the greatest 
attempts at eminent domain reform in Virginia history.”183 Though 
Joannou’s amendment passed 50-47, the bill ultimately failed in conference 
committee.184  However, the passage of Joannou’s amendment set Virginia 
apart as a state that did not erroneously rush to pass a flawed reform 
measure.185 
In 2006, Virginia successfully attempted to derail a weak reform bill, 
which would have allowed a condemnor, following certain stipulations, to 
take private property and later transfer it to a different private owner.186  In 
2007, Virginia stuck with the language of the 2006 Joannou Amendment, 
and passed comprehensive reform measures.187 House Bill 2954 was 
                                                                                                     
(showing the debate over the H.B. 94 and Delegate Joannou’s amendment) (on file with 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 181. See id. (demonstrating that the majority of the House of Delegates found the 
“primary purpose” language to be too broad). 
 182. See H.B. 94: Amendments Proposed by the House: Del. Joannou 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+amd+HB94AH (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
(stating Delegate Joannou’s proposed floor amendment that would have considerably 
strengthen H.B. 94) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 183. JEREMY P. HOPKINS, VIRGINIA INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, THE REAL STORY OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN IN VIRGINIA:  THE RISE, FALL, AND UNDETERMINED FUTURE OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 62 (2006). 
 184. See H.B. 94, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=061&typ=bil&val=hb94 (showing that after 
Joannou’s language was added on the House floor, the bill later died in conference 
committee). 
 185. See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text (showing that Virginia was not a 
state cited by Professor Somin for rushing eminent domain reform). 
 186. See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text (explaining that through the 
Joannou amendment, Virginia opted against weak reform measures). 
 187. See H.B. 2954, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007) (enacted), available at 
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offered in 2007 by Delegate Rob Bell.188 The bill defined public use to 
include “only the acquisition of property where: 
(i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership, occupation, and 
enjoyment of property by the public or a public corporation;  
 
(ii) the property is taken for construction, maintenance, or operation of 
public facilities by public corporations or by private entities provided 
that there is a written agreement with a public corporation providing for 
use of the facility by the public; 
 
 (iii) the property is taken for the creation or functioning of any public 
service corporation, public service company, or railroad;  
 
(iv) the property is taken for the provision of any authorized utility 
service by a government utility corporation;  
 
(v) the property is taken for the elimination of blight provided that the 
property itself is a blighted property; or  
 
(vi) the property taken is in a redevelopment or conservation area and is 
abandoned or the acquisition is needed to clear title where one of the 
owners agrees to such acquisition or the acquisition is by agreement of 
all the owners.”189 
Therefore, under this bill, not only was public use specifically defined, 
but blight takings were to be limited to only those properties that were 
actually blighted.190 It also specifically identified what constitutes public 
facilities, citing fifteen very definitive categories, such as “transportation 
facilities including highways, roads, streets, and bridges, traffic signals, 
relates easements and rights-of-way, mass transit, ports, and any com-
ponents of federal, state, or local transportation facilities.”191 The bill 
                                                                                                     
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HB2954 (showing the legislative hist- 
ory of H.B. 2954). 
 188. See id. (showing that Delegate Rob Bell was the chief patron of the legislation). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. (stating that the bill defined public use and limited blight takings). 
 191. Id. 
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additionally provided that no more private property than was needed for a 
particular project could be taken.192 
The strength of the 2007 legislation led to legislative complacency in 
Virginia, where from 2007 to 2011, no major pieces of legislation redefined 
public use.193 However, since 2007, there had been seven constitutional 
amendments proposed to ensure that the public use language passed that 
year would not be changed.194  On February 13, 2012, both houses of the 
Virginia General Assembly passed a constitutional amendment protecting 
public use and just compensation.195  Proclaiming that the private property 
                                                                                                     
 192. See id. (stating that the bill limited the taking to only that property that would be 
used in the project). 
 193. See generally Virginia Gen. Assembly: Legislative Info. Sys. http://leg1. 
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+men+BIL (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing that 
between 2007 and 2011, there were not any public use bills offered in the Virginia General 
Assembly) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 194. See HJ 62 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First 
Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+HJ62, (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate Ward 
Armstrong); HJ 126 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First 
Reference). http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+HJ126, (last visited Sept. 
7, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate Melanie 
Rapp); SJ 121 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First 
Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+SJ121, (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Senator Stephen 
Martin); SJ 139 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First 
Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+SJ139, (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Senator Ken 
Cuccinelli);  HJ 579 62 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers 
(First Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe ?071+sum+HJ579, (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate 
Chris Peace);  HJ 714 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers 
(First Reference) (http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/ legp504.exe?071+sum+HJ714, (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate 
Melanie Rapp); HJ 722 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers 
(First Reference) http://leg1.state. va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HJ722, (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2007 by Delegate 
Johnny Joannou ); HJ 723 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers 
(First Reference) (http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HJ723, (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2007 be Delegate 
Rob Bell) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 195. See SJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging to Private Property for 
Public Use (Second Reference), Floor: 02/13/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by 
the Senate (23-Y 16-N), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393 
SJ0003+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed 
the Senate of Virginia on February 13, 2012).  See also HJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; 
Taking or Damaging to Private Property for Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 
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right is fundamental, the amendment states the just compensation “shall be 
no less than the value of the property taken, loss of profits and lost access, 
and damages to the residue caused by the taking.”196  Regarding public use, 
the amendment states that “a taking or damaging of private property is not 
for public use if the primary use if for private gain, private benefit, private 
enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or economic develop-
ment, except for the elimination of a public nuisance existing on the 
property.”197  The condemnor bears the burden of proving that the use is 
public, without a presumption that it is.198  With this language the Virginia 
General Assembly ensured Virginia would never see a Kelo-style taking.199 
On the day after the amendment was passed, both houses also passed 
legislation to define both lost access and lost profits.200  The loss of access 
language does not “create any new right or remedy or diminish any existing 
right or remedy other than to allow the body determining just compensation 
to consider a change in access in awarding just compensation.”201  While 
loss of access was previously compensable, lost profits had not been.202  
The bill’s language allows for lost profits, using generally accepted 
business principles “for a period not to exceed three years from the date of 
                                                                                                     
House: Vote: Adoption (80-Y 18-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe? 
121+vot+HV0666+HJ0003 (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (showing the constitutional amend- 
ment passed the Virginia House of Delegates February 13, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE 
J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).  
 196. S.J. 3, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://leg1. 
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+sum+SJ3. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. (explaining that the amendment puts the public use presumption on the 
condemnor). 
 199. See id. (showing that the amendment does not allow for a private-for-private 
taking for economic use). 
 200. See HB1035 Eminent Domain: Definition of Lost Access and Lost Profits, 
Determining Compensation.  Floor: 02/14/12: House: Vote: Passage (77-Y 22-N) 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0780+HB1035 (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill passed the House of Delegates on 
February 14, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.); see also SB 437 
Eminent Domain; Definitions of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation.  
Floor: 02/14/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Passed Senate (23-Y, 17-N) 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0408SB0437 +SB0437 (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill passed the Senate of Virginia on 
February 14, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 201. H.B. 1035, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://leg1 
.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+sum+HB1035. 
 202. See id. (showing that business losses are added in the bill, as new language). 
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the valuation is suffered.”203  This loss of business profits is a step forward 
for Virginia in determining just compensation.204 
While many states passed rushed or hasty reform following Kelo, 
Virginia took four very calculated legislative steps to define public use and 
protect just compensation.205  No other state rejected weak reform in 2006, 
passed comprehensive reform defining public use in 2007, passed a 
constitutional amendment protecting both public use and just compensation, 
and then passed legislation providing for both lost access and lost profits.206  
For these reasons, Virginia could easily be seen as a perfect model for post-
Kelo reform.207 
Reform in Virginia is notable for other reasons besides its result.208  
The Virginia Constitution states that an amendment must pass two 
consecutively elected bodies of the General Assembly before it is to be 
placed on the ballot.209 In 2011, the General Assembly passed the 
amendment with a Republican-controlled House of Delegates and 
Democratic-controlled State Senate.210 In 2012, when it passed for the 
second time, the Republicans had a majority in both bodies.211  Also of 
note, in 2011, the chief sponsor of the amendment in the Republican 
                                                                                                     
 203. Id.  
 204. See id. (noting that previously in Virginia business losses were not compensable in 
eminent domain).  
 205. See discussion infra Part IV.B (stating the reform process in Virginia from 2007–
12). 
 206. See Chipchase, supra note 21, at 179–80 (showing that Virginia was the only state 
to complete these four separate legislation actions). 
 207. See id. (showing that no other state has Virginia’s four-step approach to reform). 
 208. See discussion infra Part IV.B (stating the reasons why Virginia reform efforts are 
laudable). 
 209. See Va Const. art XII, § 1 (“Any amendment . . . to this Constitution may be 
proposed in the Senate or House of Delegates, and if the same shall be agreed to by a 
majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall be . . . referred to the General Assembly . . . ”). 
 210. See Peter Rousselot, Why Virginia Democrats Lost the State Senate, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Nov. 9, 2011, www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-rousselot/2001-virginia-elections_b_ 
1083901.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (stating that democrats lost control of the state 
senate in late 2011) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 211. See Anita Kumar, Republicans Take Control of Va. Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/republicans-take-control-
of-va-senate/2012/01/11/gIQAp4JVrP_blog.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (stating that the 
Republicans controlled the Senate of Virginia in 2012). 
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controlled House of Delegates was a Democrat and the chief sponsor of the 
amendment in the Democratic controlled Senate was a Republican.212  
There was an argument of necessity made against the amendment, as 
some legislators questioned its value when the 2007 legislation seemed 
exhaustive.213 The bill’s sponsor, Delegate Rob Bell, answered by stating 
that the goal of the legislation, “is to put [the amendment] into the cons-
titution so that it can’t be tinkered with.”214  The opponents of the amend-
ment claimed that the amendment would raise just compensation and the 
increase would directly lead to infrastructure costs increasing.215 Thus, 
taxpayers would have to pay more while they would receive less, due to the 
restrictions on what can be taken under a public use.216 The Virginia 
Municipal League, the group representing Virginia localities, claimed that 
restricting public use to uses that did not include “increasing jobs, 
increasing tax revenue or economic development” would allow the “fair 
market standard to be voided, and the landowner to dictate the price of the 
property.”217 One member of the Virginia House of Delegates even 
commented, “It’s going to be a lawyer’s bonanza if it passes, as I expect it 
                                                                                                     
 212. See H.J. 693 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging of Private Property 
for Public Use (First Reference), Johnny S. Joannou http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504 
.exe?111+sum+HJ693 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the 2011 version of the 
amendment was offered in the House of Delegates by a Democrat) (on file with WASH. & 
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.); See also S.J. 307 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or 
Damaging of Private Property for Public Use (First Reference): Mark Obenshain 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?111+sum+SJ307 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
(showing the 2011 version of the amendment was offered in the Senate of Virginia by a 
Republican) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 213. See infra notes 287–92 and accompanying text (stating the objections to reform in 
Virginia). 
 214. See David Sherfinski, Local Resistance Building on Virginia’s Eminent Domain 
Change, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2011/nov 
/24/local-resistance-building-on-virginias-eminent-dom/?page=all (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
(stating Delegate Rob Bell’s, the Amendment’s sponsor, reasons for drafting and submitting 
the legislation) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 215. See Theis, infra note 241 ("They also say that the new compensation rules will 
increase the cost of infrastructure projects."). 
 216.  See id. (stating the argument made by the opponents of the reform legislation that 
the reform will ultimately harm tax payers). 
 217. See Sherfinski, supra note 214 (showing that the Virginia Municipal League is 
making the argument that restricting the public use standard back to how it was interpreted 
pre-Berman would somehow void the fair market standard). 
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will.”218  Overcoming these arguments, the amendment and its companion 
bill passed both houses.219 
C. The Hidden Weaknesses of the Virginia Model 
While the strength of the Virginia model is its comparative thorough-
ness, compared to other states’ legislation, its weakness is in the manner in 
which the reform was passed.220 Missing from the Virginia reform process 
was the support of those legislators who represent those most affected by 
eminent domain.221  Also conspicuously absent from the process was the 
grassroots support of the groups that made the opposition to Kelo so 
noteworthy.222 In Virginia, Kelo’s “strange bedfellows” never united.223 
                                                                                                     
 218. See Scott McCaffrey, County Officials, Legislators Brace for Battle on Eminent-
Domain Amendment, SUN GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.sungazette.net/arlington 
/news/county-officials-legislators-brace-for-battle-on-eminent-domain-amendment/article_ 
bb5bd992-36d1-11e1-a57c-001871e3ce6c.html, (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (stating Delegate 
Bob Brink’s claim that passage of the eminent domain amendment would dramatically 
increase property rights litigation) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 219. See SJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging to Private Property for 
Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by 
the Senate (23-Y 16-N), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393SJ0003 
+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the 
Senate of Virginia on February 13, 2012); see also HJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking 
or Damaging to Private Property for Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 House: 
Vote: Adoption (80-Y 18-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0666 
+HJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the 
Virginia House of Delegates February 13, 2012.);  see also HB1035 Eminent Domain: 
Definition of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation.  Floor: 02/14/12: 
House: Vote: Passage (77-Y 22-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+ 
HV0780+HB1035 (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill 
passed the House of Delegates on February 14, 2012); see also SB 437 Eminent Domain; 
Definitions of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation.  Floor: 02/14/12 
Senate: Read Third Time and Passed Senate (23-Y, 17-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0408SB0437+SB0437 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the 
lost access and lost profits bill passed the Senate of Virginia on February 14, 2012) (on file 
with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 220. See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text (explaining the success of the 
legislative weaknesses of reform in Virginia). 
 221. See infra notes 225–38 and accompanying text (stating that no members who 
represent minority-majority districts patroned reform and showing that many of these 
members opposed reform measures).   
 222. See discussion, infra Part III.C (discussing the arguments made by the NAACP 
and the AARP in support of the petitioner’s potion in Kelo). 
 223. See discussion, infra Part III.C (stating that in the Virginia reform process, the 
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From 2006 through 2012, legislators representing minority com-
munities rarely supported reform measures.224 In 2006, when Delegate 
Joannou’s amendment was offered to strengthen the otherwise weak 
attempt at post-Kelo reform, of the eleven African-Americans in the House 
of Delegates that session, seven voted against it.225 The Bill was then 
adopted in the House by a vote of 51-45 with eight of the nine voting 
African-American Delegates voting against eminent domain reform.226 
The following year House Bill 2954, like the 2006 bill, did not have a 
single African-American co-patron.227 The bill passed the House of 
Delegates 87-11; of the eleven members voting not to support reform, five 
were African-Americans who represented minority majority districts.228  
When the bill reached the Senate, there was an amendment to lessen the 
restrictions for a blight taking proposed by the House of Delegates.229  This 
amendment was agreed to 18-17, with all four African-American members 
who represented minority-majority districts agreeing to it.230  
                                                                                                     
political left never supported the efforts of those offering the legislation). 
 224. See infra notes 225–38 and accompanying text (showing that none of the post-
Kelo reform measures were strongly supported by the minority-majority members of the 
Virginia General Assembly). 
 225. See H.B. 94, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?061+vot+HV2933+HB0094 (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (showing that of the 
eleven African-American members in the Virginia House of Delegates in 2006, Delegates 
BaCote, Dance, Howell, A.T., Jones, D.C., McClellan, McEachin, and Melvin voted against 
Delegate Jouannou’s more restrictive public use amendment) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. 
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 226. See id., http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+vot+HV2933+HB0094 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing nine of the eleven African-American members in the 
Virginia House of Delegates in 2006 voted against eminent domain reform) (on file with 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).  
 227. See H.B. 2954, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007), 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+mbr+HB2954 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
(demonstrating that of the sixteen co-patrons, none were African-American) (on file with 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 228. See id. (showing that of the ten votes against the eminent domain reform bill, 
African-American Delegates BaCote, McClellan, Melvin, Spruill, and Ward voted or 
intended to vote against it). 
 229. See id. (showing an amendment proposed by Sen. Williams to lessen the blight 
language of the original bill). 
 230. See id. (showing state senators Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, and Miller all voting for 
the amendment lessening the restrictions on a blight taking). 
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In 2011, Virginia first proposed a constitutional amendment to ensure 
the definition of public use could not be changed in the future.231 The 
amendment passed the House of Delegates 18-8.232 Of the votes cast 
against the reform amendment, four were from African-Americans and five 
were from those who represented minority majority districts.233 The 
amendment then passed the Senate of Virginia 31-8, where no African-
Americans supported the bill, with five of the eight negative votes coming 
from African-Americans.234 
Pursuant to the Virginia Constitution, the constitutional amendment 
that passed the General Assembly in 2011 had to pass both bodies, in its 
identical form again in 2012.235  In 2012 as in 2011, the amendment did not 
receive a single African-American co-patron in either body.236  It was then 
opposed by every African-American member of the State Senate.237  In the 
House of Delegates in 2012, of the eighteen votes against the amendment, 
                                                                                                     
 231. H.J. 693, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011). 
 232. See H.J.  2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?111+vot+SV0614HJ0693+HJ0693 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the 
vote count for the second passage of H.J. 693) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & 
SOC. JUST.). 
 233. See id. (showing that of those members who voted against the bill Delegates 
Dance, Herring, McClellan, and James are African, and Morrissey represents a minority 
majority district). 
 234. See H.J. 693, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011), 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?111+vot+SV0614HJ0693+HJ0693, (last visited 
Sept. 9. 2012) (showing state senators Locke, Lucas, Marsh, McEachin, and Miller, all five 
African-American members of the Senate of Virginia voting against reform). 
 235. See VA CONST. art XII, §1 (“Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution 
may be proposed in the Senate or House of Delegates, and if the same shall be agreed to by a 
majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall be entered on their journals, the name of each member and how he voted 
to be recorded, and referred to the General Assembly at its first regular session held after the 
next general election of members of the House of Delegates.”). 
 236. See S.J. Res. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), http://leg1.state. 
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+mbr+SJ3 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing there were not 
any African-American co-patrons) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.); 
see also Constitutional amendment; H.J. Res. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121 +mbr+HJ3  (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
(showing there were not any African-American co-patrons) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. 
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 237. See id. (showing Senators Locke, Lucas, March, McEachin and Miller all voting 
against the measure). 
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one-third came from members who represent minority-majority 
constituencies.238 
Like the amendment, the bill defining lost access and business losses 
did not receive a single African-American co-patron or a single African-
American vote in the Senate of Virginia. In the House of Delegates, of the 
twenty-two votes against the bill, eight came from members who represent 
minority-majority districts.239 
Virginia’s constitutional amendment received both support and 
opposition from well-funded lobbying efforts.240  The Virginia Municipal 
League lobbied the General Assembly against the amendment arguing that 
it was too far reaching and that it would increase the costs of infrastructure 
improvements.241  Conversely, the Virginia Farm Bureau made the eminent 
domain amendment a top priority on its legislative agenda.242  The group 
organized grassroots support for the measure and lobbied professionally for 
its passage.243 While groups like the Farm Bureau and the Virginia Pro-
perty Rights Coalition actively supported reform, advocacy groups like the 
NAACP and the AARP did not participate in the discussion.244  Neither of 
these groups, which traditionally lobby the Virginia General Assembly, 
                                                                                                     
 238.  See H.J. Res. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), http://leg1.state.va.us/ 
cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0666+HJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing one-
third of African-American Delegates in the House of Delegates opposing the measure) (on 
file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 239. Id. 
 240. See infra note 241 (showing that both the Virginia Farm Bureau and the Virginia 
Municipal League both lobbied the Virginia General Assembly regarding eminent domain 
reform). 
 241. See Michael Theis, Eminent Domain Changes Spook Cities, THE FREDERICKSBURG 
PATCH, Nov. 28, 2011, http://fredericksburg.patch.com/articles/eminent-domain-changes-
spook-cities (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“The Virginia Municipal League, which lobbies on 
behalf of Virginia's 38 independent cities, say the proposed amendment is unnecessary and 
could lead to frivolous lawsuits and more costly public improvements.”) (on file with WASH. 
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 242. See Eminent Domain Constitutional Amendment Passes in Senate, House, 
VIRGINIA FARMS BUREAU, http://vafarmbureau.org/NewsVideo/NewsHeadlines/tabid/347/ 
articleType/ArticleView/articleId/688/Eminent_domain_constitutional_amendment_passes_i
n_Senate_House.aspx (visited Sept. 9, 2012) (explaining that the eminent domain 
amendment was a top priority of the Virginia Farm Bureau in 2012) (on file with WASH. & 
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 243. See id. (stating how the Virginia Farm Bureau was supporting the reform 
measure). 
 244. See infra note 248 and accompanying text (showing that the NAACP and AARP 
were silent on reform measures). 
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organized grassroots support or employed professional lobbyists to ad-
vocate for reform.245  On its website, the Virginia chapter of the AARP lists 
its legislative priorities for each session of the General Assembly.246  The 
2012 list did not include any references to eminent domain reform.247  A 
sponsor of the amendment, Delegate Rob Bell, stated that the groups that 
traditionally support the interest of ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, 
or the indigent were silent on the reform measures.248 
V. Proposing a Stronger, More Inclusive Model 
This Note asserts that while Virginia has seemingly been successful in 
its post-Kelo eminent domain reform measures, the state’s legislative 
actions exhibit a flawed model.249  In furthering its assertion that Virginia’s 
model for reform should be improved upon, this Note proposes that for 
reform that is inclusive, understandable, and accessible, those who are 
advocating for it must encourage involvement among those who have been 
most affected.250  Reform is not successful because it simply becomes law; 
to be successful reform must include those most affected and be responsive 
to their needs.251  Those advancing reform in states contemplating post-
Kelo legislative actions would be well advised to solicit the advocacy and 
                                                                                                     
 245. See id. (showing that these groups took made no efforts to lobby the General 
Assembly for the eminent domain amendment). 
 246. See AARP Is Fighting for You at the Virginia General Assembly, AARP, 
http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-01-2012/fighting-for-you-va1788.html 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing AARP’s legislative priorities for 2012). 
 247. See id. (showing that the eminent domain amendment is not listed as a priority for 
the AARP in 2012). 
 248. See Telephone Interview with Delegate Robert Bell, Member, Virginia House of 
Delegates (Feb. 18, 2012) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.) 
(explaining that the AARP, the NAACP, and other groups that regularly advocate for the 
interests of ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent did not lobby or 
advocate for any of the Virginia eminent domain measures). 
 249. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing the flaws in the Virginia model for 
eminent domain reform). 
 250. See infra notes 268–98 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to better 
eminent domain reform). 
 251. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing that reform in Virginia included 
measures that were not specific to those most affected). 
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political support of those most statistically affected by eminent domain 
before passing remedial measures.252 
There are several reasons why the support of these disproportionately 
affected groups matter.  First, those proposing reform may need the votes of 
those representing the disproportionately affected, in order to have the 
majorities necessary for the bills to be enacted.253 In Virginia, the 
Republicans who supported reform were able to garner enough votes from 
certain Democrats to pass the 2007 and 2012 bills and the pass the 2011-12 
amendment.254  However, in 2012, the amendment barely passed the Sen-
ate, 23-17.255 While Virginia had the votes necessary to push the 
amendment against the will of members representing disproportionately 
affected groups, other states may not have a similar luxury, and support 
from these key groups may be critical to get reform measures passed.256 
Second, the uniting of diverse political interests in support of eminent 
domain draws attention to property rights.257 This increase in attention 
leads to greater advocacy. The Kelo controversy spurred support from both 
the political right and left.258 In part, it was this uniting of the cons-
titutionalists with the minority interests that attracted so much attention to 
Kelo.259  When seemingly diverse interests aligned, more people became 
interested in property rights, a topic that, prior to Kelo, was previously 
                                                                                                     
 252. See discussion supra Part III.B (stating that statistically ethnic and racial 
minorities, the elderly, and the indigent have historically been most adversely affected by the 
broadening of the Public Use Clause). 
 253. See supra notes 235–37 accompanying text (explaining that the amendment nearly 
failed in the Senate of Virginia in 2012). 
 254. See discussion supra Part IV.C (noting that in both 2011 and 2012 the majority of 
support for the amendment came from Republicans in both houses and that the bills were 
primarily patroned and co-patroned by Republicans). 
 255. See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text (showing that in 2012 the 
amendment barely passed the Senate of Virginia). 
 256. See 2010 Post-Election Control of Legislatures, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/2010-postelection-con 
trol-of-legislatures.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing those states in which the 
legislatures are controlled by Republicans, Democrats, and those states where legislative 
control is split) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 257. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that the uniting of 
strange bedfellows brought attention to Kelo). 
 258. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (showing those groups that supported 
the Petitioner in Kelo). 
 259. See Gillespie, supra note 12 (explaining the seemingly unlikely political alliances 
that were formed as a result of the publicity surrounding Kelo v. City of New London 
generated more publicity for the case). 
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politically stagnant.260 In Virginia, the amendment attracted media at-
tention as the interests of groups such as the Virginia Farm Bureau were at 
odds with interests such as those of the Virginia Municipal League.261  
States contemplating future reform should not just focus on gaining the 
support of conservative groups, but should also acquire support from 
groups that commonly represent the needs of ethnic and racial minorities, 
the elderly, and the indigent such as the AARP and the NAACP.  The 
fusion of these diverse groups will naturally draw more attention and 
support to property rights issues.262 
Third, by including those most affected in process, those advocating 
reform greatly increase the strength of their lobbying ability. In Virginia 
there was not any professional lobbying for eminent domain reform on 
behalf of ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent.263  
Advocacy groups like the Farm Bureau lobbied for the constitutional 
amendment, but their political voice would have been stronger had they 
been joined by groups representing those who have been most affected by 
eminent domain.264  Strong lobbying also reminds legislators that, even 
after Kelo, the public still cares about the property rights.265  In Virginia 
some legislators who represented minority-majority districts felt that 
eminent domain reform was not an issue of importance to their cons-
tituencies.266  This problem could be remedied if those who have been most 
affected effectively lobby their legislators. In the future, states considering 
reform should recognize that including those most affected in the reform 
process greatly strengthens the lobbying effort. 
                                                                                                     
 260. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11 at 3 (demonstrating the decade long complacency with 
property rights had ended). 
 261. See Theis, supra note 241 (demonstrating that lobbying efforts supporting and 
opposing reform and the media attention resulting from those efforts). 
 262. See Gillespie, supra note 12 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the 
uniting of diverse groups draws attention to reform). 
 263. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (stating amendment patron Rob Bell 
noting that those who commonly lobby for concerns of ethnic and racial minorities, the 
elderly, and the indigent were not active in the reform process). 
 264. See infra note 274 and accompanying text (stating the support of the Virginia 
Farm Bureau in lobbying for the amendment in Virginia). 
 265. See infra note 291 and accompanying text (stating that Virginia Delegate Lionell 
Spruill Sr. thinks that most of his constituents feel as though eminent domain takings are no 
longer a major race issue that constituents are concerned with). 
 266. See id. (stating that Virginia Delegate Lionell Spruill Sr. felt as though eminent 
domain reform was not a major issue for his constituents). 
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Fourth, the inclusion of those most affected by eminent domain in the 
legislative process could make the reform laws more effective. Virginia 
passed legislation in 2012 to allow for lost access and business losses to be 
compensable as parts of just compensation.267  While the lost access issue 
may be of importance for those most affected by the broadening of the 
Public Use Clause, it is doubtful that lost business uses are particularly 
meaningful.  There are issues and remedies that could be of importance to 
those most affected that were not considered in Virginia because those most 
affected were not active in the reform process.268  Once those who are most 
affected, are participating in the reform process, they can easily share their 
ideas on how to protect both public use and just compensation. 
A. Education 
This Note proposes that education is the first step in successfully 
reuniting Kelo’s strange bedfellows. In building a broad cross-section of 
support for eminent domain reform, this Note offers that a few key realities 
must be addressed. Compared to many issues that are lobbied for on the 
state level by ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent, 
eminent domain reform could be seen as esoteric or recondite.269 In 
explaining how complex the concept of property is, property law scholar 
Richard Pipes wrote, “discussions of property from the time of Plato and 
Aristotle to the present have revolved around four principle themes: its 
relation to politics, ethics, economics, and psychology.”270  Even at a base 
level property rights are opaque.271  With property rights reform, there is 
both mass general ignorance and mass confusion.272  Recent survey data to 
                                                                                                     
 267. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (showing that in 2012 Virginia passed 
laws to allow for business losses and lost access to be compensable under just 
compensation). 
 268. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how the issues of those most affected 
were not communicated in the Virginia reform process). 
 269. See infra note 270 and accompanying text (stating that concepts are property rights 
are conceptually difficult to grasp). 
 270. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 4 (Vintage Books 1st ed. 2000) 
(stating that there are traditionally four themes in viewing property rights). 
 271. See id. (showing that the conceptualization of property rights involves under-
standing of various academic disciplines). 
 272. See Somin, supra note 10 (“The ineffectiveness of post-Kelo reforms is part 
caused by public ignorance.”). 
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show that “only 13% of Americans know whether their state has enacted a 
post-Kelo eminent domain reform law and whether that law is likely to be 
effective or not.273 
This situation, in which people are historically affected by an issue that 
is not understood, invites education. There are very concrete simple 
solutions to remedy these situations of ignorance and confusion. Those 
interested in reform should speak at local meetings and meet with decision 
makers of the groups most statistically affected, prior to the measures 
coming before the legislatures. They should also share with those in-
dividuals and groups the arguments made in the amicus brief by the 
NAACP and AARP in 2005. The section of the Justice Thomas’s dissent 
addressing these issues should be disseminated. In addition, those interested 
in reform should find abusive takings cases within the state in which they 
are advocating reform and have the victims of those takings speak with 
these advocacy groups. Former Virginia State Senator, now Attorney 
General, Ken Cuccinelli, a major advocate of post-Kelo reform, success-
fully met the Farm Bureau to educate its members on the eminent domain 
issues and how they could lobby for reform in Virginia.274  In the future this 
type of action needs to be taken with those most affected as well. 
B. Lobbying Efforts 
Having a strong lobby for reform is not only a benefit of the fusion of 
Kelo’s bedfellows, it also a step in further uniting diverse political entities. 
When those interested in eminent domain reform think about the state 
legislative process, it must be remembered that eminent domain is one of 
many diverse issues that must be addressed and voted on in a very short 
amount of time. Since eminent domain is not addressed every year, it is a 
mistake to assume legislators comprehensively understand the issue. Often 
state legislative sessions are truncated.275 In Virginia, in odd years the 
                                                                                                     
 273. See id. (explaining that large majorities of people surveyed do not know if their 
state has passed post-Kelo reform). 
 274. See Virginia Growers Continue to Push for Eminent Domain Reform, SOUTHEAST 
FARM PRESS, Feb. 2, 2012, http://southeastfarmpress.com/government/virginia-growers-
continue-push-eminent-domain-reform (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (demonstrating Attorney 
General Ken Cuccinelli encouraging the Farm Bureau to lobby for eminent domain reform 
in Virginia) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 275. See VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (stating that the legislative sessions may be truncated). 
The Virginia Constitution states: 
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session lasts for only thirty days, in even years, when the General Assembly 
is tasked with proposing a state budget, the session lasts for 60 days.276  In 
the 2012 Virginia General Assembly session there were 2,698 pieces of 
legislation offered that each house considered in 60 days or roughly 45 bills 
per day.277  Given the number of bills that come before the legislature and 
the complexity of many of these bills, members do not have the time to 
grasp the complexities of all these issues.278  Therefore, arguments on be-
half of reform should be made on behalf of those most affected before the 
session starts so that members can encourage other members to support 
such reform. Once the session starts, lobbying groups should regularly try 
to inform members that reform is an important issue given the history of 
eminent domain. As Attorney General Cucinelli recommended to the Farm 
Bureau,279 once the session has started, those supporting reform should 
lobby at the state house. In encouraging advocacy in Virginia, Cuccinelli 
stated that, “There is no substitute to being present . . . e-mails don’t com-
pare to a good, solid handshake.”280 These are simplistic steps at en-
couraging inclusive comprehensive reform, but these actions were not taken 
in Virginia by those most statistically affected.281 
                                                                                                     
Except as herein provided for reconvened sessions, no regular session of the 
General Assembly convened in an even-numbered year shall continue longer 
than sixty days; no regular session of the General Assembly convened in an odd-
numbered year shall continue longer than thirty days; but with the concurrence 
of two-thirds of the members elected to each house, any regular session may be 
extended for a period not exceeding thirty days. 
Id. 
 276. See id. (stating the number of days in a session of the Virginia General Assembly). 
 277. See generally Virginia General Assembly: Legislative Information System, 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+men+BIL (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) 
(showing that in the 2012 session of the Virginia General Assembly 2,698 pieces of 
legislation were offered) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 278. See id. (showing the number of bills taken up by either body on a given day). 
 279. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (showing Attorney General Cuccinelli 
instructing the Farm Bureau on how to lobby in Virginia). 
 280. See id. (showing Cuccinelli not just encouraging the group but instructing them on 
how to advocate). 
 281. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how those who are most affected by the 
broadening of the Public Use Clause did not participate in reform in Virginia). 
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C. Co-Patrons 
Another way to build broad support would be to have major eminent 
domain bills offered by diverse sponsors. In Virginia, in 2012, the 
amendment was carried by conservative State Senator Mark Obenshain in 
the Senate and conservative Delegate Rob Bell in the House of 
Delegates.282 By contrast, on February 28, 2012, the House of 
Representatives again proved the power of “strange bedfellows” aligning as 
that body passed an eminent domain measures that was sponsored by an 
African-American Democrat, Maxine Waters, and a white Republican, Jim 
Sensenbrenner.283 Representative Sensenbrenner stated, “This is a 
Sensenbrenner-Waters bill. You will never see another Sensenbrenner-
Waters bill, and that is probably one of the best reasons to vote in favor of 
it.”284  True to the strength of the “strange bedfellows” idea, Representative 
Waters stated that she supported the measure because she thought it would 
be beneficial to the poor and to those most affect by the Kelo decision.285  
Similar to the reasons given by the NAACP for opposing a widening of the 
Public Use Clause, Representative Waters added, “The government now 
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those 
with more. The founders cannot have intended this perverse result.”286  
Excluding the fact that Virginia voted on its amendment February 13, 2012 
and the House of Representatives acted on its legislation February 28, 2012, 
the House provided an example of “strange bedfellows” uniting that 
Virginia should have followed.287  
                                                                                                     
 282. See S.J. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393SJ0003+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing 
Senator Mark Obenshain as the patron of the Senate version of the amendment) (on file with 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.);  H.J. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 
2011), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe? 121+vot+HV0666+HJ0003 (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing Delegate Robert Bell as the patron of the House version of the 
amendment) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 283. See Pete Kasperowicz, House Votes to Overturn Supreme Court Decision on 
Eminent Domain, THE HILL’S FLOOR ACTION BLOG, Feb. 28, 2012, http://thehill.com/blogs 
/floor-action/house/213129-house-votes-to-overturn-supreme-court-property-rights-decision 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing that the United States House of Representatives passed 
a reform bill that was sponsored by a African-American Democrat and a white Republican) 
(on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 284. See id. (showing the value of diverse political interests working together for 
eminent domain reform). 
 285. See id. (stating the reasons why Rep. Waters supported eminent domain reform). 
 286. See id. (showing Representative Waters identifying those concerns previously 
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D. Reviving the 2005 Arguments 
Strong reforms include being able to understand and respond to the 
opposition’s arguments. This Note has explained that those most affected 
by reform were active in expressing opposition to Kelo. The question 
becomes: Why were these groups opposed to reform in Virginia? There are 
a few possible answers to this question. First, there is the pragmatic answer, 
which was often written about in Virginia newspapers.288  The argument is 
that eminent domain reform is harmful to the localities. 289  It raises the 
costs of projects, it burdens the locality’s ability to grow economically, and 
it hampers the town’s desire to eradicate unsightly blight.290  These issues 
are of specific importance to African-American legislators representing 
minority-majority communities, because they often represent urban 
areas.291 Additionally, while it is clear that takings had a regrettable 
negative impact on African-Americans, some African-American legislators 
believe that the era of takings based on racial discrimination has passed.292  
Anecdotally, African-American leaders may not feel that the racial threat is 
still prevalent, regardless of statistics or the language of the NAACP dissent 
in Kelo.293 
                                                                                                     
identified by the NAACP-AARP brief as reasons for supporting reform). 
 287. See discussion infra Part IV.C (showing that in Virginia there was never an 
alignment of the political forces as there was in the United States House of Representatives). 
 288. See Michael Theis, Eminent Domain Changes Spook Cities, THE FREDERICKSBURG 
PATCH, Nov. 28, 2011, http://fredericksburg.patch.com/articles/eminent-domain-changes-
spook-cities (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (demonstrating the arguments made by groups such 
as the Virginia Municipal League that eminent domain reform could be infrastructure 
improvements more costly for localities) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST.). 
 289. See id. ("The Virginia Municipal League, which lobbies on behalf of Virginia's 38 
independent cities, say the proposed amendment is unnecessary and could lead to frivolous 
lawsuits and more costly public improvements.").  
 290. See id. (stating the arguments against eminent domain reform). 
 291. See Commonwealth of Virginia Division of Legislative Services, REDISTRICTING 
2010, http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing that the 
majority of minority-majority districts in the Virginia encompass urban areas) (on file with 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 292. See Telephone Interview with Delegate Lionell Spruill Sr., Member, Virginia 
House of Delegates (Jan. 5, 2012) (on file with the on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL 
RTS. & SOC. JUST.) (stating that racial takings are no longer considered to the be the issue 
they once were). 
 293. See id. (stating that Delegate Lionell Spruill Sr. does not think that Virginia is still 
in a period where there are massive race-based takings). 
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These theoretical explanations for why reform was not advocated for 
in Virginia by those most affected fail to address the reality that the 
arguments made in the amicus brief simply were not offered during the 
reform process in Virginia.294 The amicus brief provides a structural 
roadmap for advancing arguments that should be addressed in the future by 
states considering reform.295  The amicus brief and Justice Thomas’s dis-
sent both make clear that:  1) A broad reading of the Public Use Clause 
disproportionately affects ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the 
indigent and 2) When a taking affects a member of one of those groups the 
degree of impact from the taking is greater.296  In the future, those pro-
posing eminent domain reform should rely on the arguments made in the 
NAACP Brief and the arguments made by Justice Thomas to counter any 
opposition. 
E. New Proposals 
In order for reform to be exhaustive, a variety of interests must be 
addressed. In the future, when states consider eminent domain reform, this 
Note argues that it would be most effective to hear the concerns of those 
most affected. The concerns of those disproportionately impacted may be 
vastly different from those proposing reform legislation.297  In the second 
round of reform in Virginia, the state took steps to make access and 
business losses compensable.298 While access losses may be beneficial to 
members of disproportionally affected groups, it is doubtful that the 
compensability of future business losses will have a significant impact. This 
Note does not argue against making business losses compensable, it simply 
                                                                                                     
 294. See discussion supra Part IV.C (stating that those who traditionally represent the 
interests of minorities, the indigent, and the elderly were not part of the reform process in 
Virginia). 
 295. See discussion supra Part III.C (showing the NAACP Amicus Brief outlines the 
harms the widening of the Public Use Clause has had on ethnic and racial minorities, the 
indigent, and the elderly). 
 296. See discussion supra Part III.C (showing the harm and degree the widening of the 
Public Clause has on those most affected); see supra note 138 and accompanying text 
(stating how Justice Thomas assumes an increasing in the widening of the Public Use Clause 
will have a detrimental effect on those already most affected by eminent domain). 
 297. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (showing that in 2012 Virginia proposed 
legislation to allow for future business losses to be compensable). 
 298. See id. (showing that in 2012 Virginia proposed legislation to allow for lost access 
and business losses to be considered for just compensation). 
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points out that these are losses that are not of particular relevance to those 
most affected. 
If a state were to engage in reform and would include those most 
affected, in addition to the compensability of these losses, a state could 
entertain the issue of allowing for attorney’s fees to be compensable in 
eminent domain litigation. The provision for attorney’s fees would have a 
direct impact on these vulnerable groups, because without them, a just 
compensation award is not truly just, as attorney’s fees must be subtracted 
from whatever the jury determines as the value of the property. If the party 
subject to the take hires a lawyer on a one-third contingency fee, his actual 
gross award will be inevitably less than what is just. However, if the party 
subject to the take does not retain an attorney, they could be left with an 
offer far less than just compensation minus attorney’s fees. 
Where there are only so many eminent domain lawyers in an area, 
there is a certain level of economy in the cases they take.299  Where prop-
erty values are lower, the attorney has less of an incentive for taking the 
case. These are the type of problems that could be raised if those most 
historically affected by takings were involved in the solution process. The 
issue is not per se whether Virginia should have included business takings 
and should be discussed in reform. The fact that Virginia passed reform 
without even considering such ideas proves that the Virginia model is 
flawed. Takings issues had affected certain groups more than others for 
specific reasons. Therefore, those most subject to takings should be instru-
mental in the reform decisions. 
VI. Conclusion 
After the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo trilogy whittled away the Fifth 
Amendment Public Use Clause to what Justice Thomas called a “virtual 
nullity,”300  Virginia and forty-one other states then passed various forms of 
state eminent domain reform.301 The legislative action in Virginia is 
                                                                                                     
 299. See generally OWNERS’ COUNSEL OF AMERICA, http://www.ownerscounsel.com/ 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the number of attorneys who exclusively practice 
eminent domain law in certain states). 
 300. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (“Today's 
decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a 
virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning.”). 
 301. See Somin, supra note 10 (explaining that forty-two states have enacted legislation 
protecting property rights after 2005). 
ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITIES 119 
 
laudable as the state distinguished itself as the only state to resist 
comparatively weak reactionary reform, pass strong comprehensive reform, 
and then pass both a constitutional amendment protecting eminent domain 
and additional legislation that better ensured just compensation.302  With all 
of its success, Virginia missed a golden opportunity to include those who 
have been most impacted by eminent domain in its reform measures.303  In 
the future states should not follow the Virginia model, but instead, should 
unite the “strange bedfellows” that were brought together by Kelo. In order 
for future state action to be truly successful, the legislative reform process 
cannot forsake the voices of those most affected. 
  
                                                                                                     
 302. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing Virginia’s comparative legislative 
successes). 
 303. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing weaknesses in the Virginia model). 
